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Abstract:. This study examines the explosion of violent ethno-political conflicts in Central Nigeria in 1960. At 
the attainment of independence, Nigeria comprised three loosely amalgamated regions which later 
metamorphosed into three ethnic based political parties namely; the Northern People‟s Congress(NPC), 
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C) in the East, and the Action  Group (AG) in the West. 
With this political structure, the seed of minority domination was already sown. The main thrust of this paper is 
the resistance of the Tiv to the despotic leadership of the Hausa/Fulani with their instrument of coercion, the 
Native Administrative Police Forces (NAPFS).Drawing inferences from this study, lessons can be learnt from 
the British colonial political culture of regionalism which fosters crisis of nation building in Nigeria. 
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Résumé: Cette étude examine l'explosion des conflits ethno-politiques violents dans le centre du Nigéria des 
années 60. A la conquête de l'indépendance, le Nigéria se composait de trois régions vaguement fusionnées qui 
sont plus tard métamorphosées en trois pouvoirs politiques basés sur l'ethnie, à savoir: le congrès du peuple du 
Nord (CPN), le Conseil national du Nigéria et du Cameroun (CNNC) à l'Est, et le Groupe d'action (GA) à 
l'Ouest. Avec cette structure politique, la semence de la domination de la minorité était déjà semé. L'objectif 
principal de cet article est d'étudier la résistance des Tivs à la direction despotique de l'ethnie Haousa / Fulani 
avec leur instrument de coercition, les Forces policières administratives autochtones (FSPAA). A partir de cette 
étude, on peut tirer des leçons sur la culture du régionalisme coloniale britannique qui favorise la crise de la 
construction nationale au Nigéria. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Tiv are the largest single ethnic group in the Middle Benue Basin in Central Nigeria. They are the majority ethnic 
group in the present Benue State, Nigeria where they are found in fourteen Local Government Areas. The Tiv are 
estimated to number about five million people and about three million out of this number live in Benue State. 
(Okpeh,2007:2). The rest of them are found in considerable numbers in Southern Taraba State, parts of Nassarawa State, 
Plateau and Cross River States. At the attainment of independence, Nigeria was divided into three regions representing the 
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three major ethnic groups namely the North (Hausa-Fulani), the East (Igbo) and the West (Yoruba).The group of 
politicians that emerged at the attainment of  independence had the massive support of their ethnic groups and political 
parties. In the North, the Northern People‟s Congress (NPC) had a large Hausa/Fulani following with Alhaji Tafawa 
Balewa as the leader. In the West, the Action Group (A.G.) had a massive Yoruba following with Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo as the leader, while in the East, it was the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon‟s (N.C.N.C) with a 
large Igbo followership headed by Dr.Nnnamdi Azikwe. In the Middle Belt, it was the United Middle Belt Congress 
(UMBC) a minority Tiv party with large followership led by Mr. Joseph Sarwuan Tarka (Aper, 2003:322). 
This division of the country into „majorities‟ and „minorities‟ ethnic groups  encouraged sentiments, sowing the seeds 
of conflicts which the emergent political leaders exploited exerting firm control at the regions at the detriment of the 
centre.  Each of the regional political parties tried its best to win the support of the Tiv. This was based on the fact that the 
political party that the Tiv accepted would control the Central Nigeria and its resources. The reaction of the Tiv was the 
rejection of the subordinate roles offered to them by some of these parties especially the NPC controlled government. The 
Tiv in the rejection of this inferior role decided to rally round their leader J.S.Tarka and their party, the UMBC. Their 
rejection of the NPC controlled government was symbolic, as the acceptance would mean accepting Hausa /Fulani 
domination. In addition, the majorities of Tiv population were Christians and prejudiced against Islam. They believed that 
when a Tiv became a Muslim, he would copy Hausa custom and forget his own culture and come to despise his people. In 
addition, the exciting political arrangement before independence and after meant that the major ethnic groups controlled 
the regional governments; hence the monopoly of power and patronages to their own exclusive advantage 
(Tseayo,1975:96-98).The rejection of the NPC, and all that was associated with it was to lead to the bitter and violent 
political upheavals in Tivland during the First Republic. The attempt by the NPC,  the ruling party at independence to 
dominate Tivland by the use of coercive measures including the Tiv Native Administration and its police forces failed and 
this culminated in the 1960 and 1964 riots(Abeghe,2005:68-80). This paper examines  how the misuse of Native 
Administrative Police Forces by the NPC controlled government led to the  riots.  
This paper is divided into five main sections. After the introduction is the conceptual framework. The next section 
deals with the background to the political conflicts in Tivland, our area of study. The third section deals with policing and 
the  emergence of the  Native Administration  Police Forces (NAPFS),in pre-colonial and colonial Nigeria, while the last 
two sections deal with the Tiv revolts  as a response to  the misuse of  the NAPFS. 
 
1.  A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
The 1960 and 1964 conflicts in Tivland had ethnic and political undertones. Conflict is a serious disagreement, contention 
or state of antagonism between two or more parties or groups. Conflicts evolve from variations in interests, values, ideas, 
ideologies, orientations, perceptions and tendencies and are part and parcel of social existence and progress 
(Gyuse,Ajene,2006:242). Conflicts are end results of contradictions that exist in the human society.  It is a state of discord 
caused by the actual or perceived opposition of needs, values and interests between people. It can result in stress or tension 
and negative feelings between disputants, and it is not only disruptive and destructive but also 
constructive(Bello,2006:30).Therefore, it is not only the destructive nature of conflicts that counts, but whether groups 
involved in conflicts can maintain a healthy relationship after the conflicts. Conflict thus serves as a medium for creating 
integration between groups. A conflict is said to exist when two or more parties with perceived incompatible goals seek to 
undermine each others goal seeking capability. Conflicts may take place between individuals, groups; between 
individuals and organizations or groups; or between an organization and one or more of its components. Conflict is said to 
emerge whenever two or more persons or groups seek to possess the same object, occupy the same space of an exclusive 
portion, play incompatible goals and undertake mutually incompatible means for achieving their purpose(Ker,2001:3) 
One of the most celebrated definitions of conflict by Coser maintains that:  
The struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting 
parties are not only to gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate their 
rivals(Otite,1991:1) 
Ethnic conflicts are conflicts that are perpetuated, supported and directed by members of a particular ethnic group 
against another. Ethnicity involves a nation, group, race or tribe that has a common cultural tradition, or a person or group 
of people belonging to a specific country or area by birth or family history rather than by nationality. The heterogeneous 
and multi ethnic nature of Nigeria has made the country a fertile ground for such conflicts. Nigerians think more of their 
membership and allegiance to their ethnic groups than their belonging to the nation. The zealous support of Nigerians to 
their ethnic groups has often led to violence.  
Political conflicts are usually struggles arising from disagreements or contestations over the sharing and holding of 
political appointments, the creation of administrative areas and the creation of local government areas and their purported 
headquarters. This problem could be traced to the colonial period, when traditional institutions were subjected to the 
needs of the colonial administration. The colonial authorities elevated some traditional institutions at the detriment of 
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others. Experience has shown that the clamor for new administrative areas does not solve the problems or give a sense of 
belonging to the groups in their new areas, if created. When new states or local government areas are created, new 
majority or minority groups emerge with attendant problems. 
 Remi Anifowese attempts an explanation of the Tiv Riots, by proposing the frustration-aggression theory as being the 
bedrock of the conflicts(Anifowose,1979:77). This means when individuals or groups feel frustrated because their basic 
needs are being thwarted, the tendency is to strike back at what is perceived to be causing the frustration. The Tiv felt the 
NPC controlled government was responsible for all their woes hence the need to fight back. 
 
2.  POLICING IN PRE-COLONIAL NIGERIA  
As Killingray (1986: 416) rightly illustrates, British colonialism in Africa did not fully monopolize the means of coercion 
and violence. It is a well known fact that under the indirect rule system, practices of coercion such as tax collection, 
recruitment of forced labour, regulation of sanitation and, more importantly for the purpose of this paper, the preservation 
of law and order as well as the maintenance of security were delegated to Native Authorities (Fourchard, 2008:28). While 
it is important to state that in several parts of Nigeria the powers of the police were transferred to local communities 
through the Native Administration Police Forces (NAPFs), it is even more significant to observe that the very idea of the 
NAPFs came about through the adaptation of Nigeria‟s pre-colonial police organizations, especially those of the 
centralized emirates of the North as well as those of the Yoruba and Edo kingdoms of the West. This scenario fitted 
perfectly into Mahmood Mamdani‟s description of indirect rule as a „decentralized despotism‟ through which „local 
custom within a larger colonial project was a way of achieving a hegemonic domination‟ (Mamdani, 2002: 286). 
Among the numerous palace officials in the centralized emirates of the North and the Yoruba and Edo kingdoms of the 
West were those who performed the role of police. In the emirates they were known as dogarai (Smith, 1960: 36; Nadama, 
1977: 337, 352). Smith notes that the dogarai had the duty to „capture and discipline offenders, and to guard the town 
together with warders‟ (Smith, 1960: 338). Fika (1978: 40-41) and Ubah (1973: 47-48) also gave a detailed description of 
the multifarious duties of the dogarai. These included the prevention and detection of crime as well as general prosecution 
of criminals. 
In the western part of Nigeria they were known variously as ilari (in Oyo), emese (in the Ife, Ijesa and Ekiti kingdoms) 
and agunren  in Ijebu-Ode. (Rotimi, 2001: 2). In the Yoruba kingdoms, the ilari, emese and agunren  represented in the 
eyes of the populace the symbol of legitimate force. Like the dogarai they apprehended and prosecuted criminals. It is 
even said that the consent of the agunren was necessary to give the stamp of legitimacy to any Ijebu military campaign 
(Oroge, 1971: 44). 
Though there is a dearth of scholarly studies on the pre-colonial policing system among the Igbo in Eastern Nigeria, 
available evidence suggests that a body of men known locally as umuokorobia and drawn mainly from the age-grade 
system performed police duties in many parts of Eastern Nigeria. Apart from the umuokorobia which were charged with 
the responsibility of security maintenance and general law enforcement, the masquerade cult, mmanwu also performed 
traditional police duties. The police action of the mmanwu was generally referred to as iri iwu. This traditional policing 
system involved the prevention of crime through the identification, arrest and enforcement of sanctions by means of fines 
known locally as oriri iwu or by igba ekpe, i.e., the public humiliation of a criminal. A special force, the iga, kept 
surveillance over village streams during the dry season in order to enforce the preservation of water resources (Okafo, 
2007: 8-9; Isichei, 1978: 74).  
It is noteworthy especially in Northern and Western Nigeria that the pre-colonial police formations had the following 
common features. Firstly, they were drawn from palace slaves and were appointed by and responsible to the kings. Next, 
they had a political head who was a senior official of government and almost always an eunuch with a distinctive dress 
and / or hairstyle. They also combined the triple roles of bodyguard, messenger and executioner. Finally, they performed 
diplomatic and revenue- collecting functions (Rotimi, 2001: 2).  
The foregoing brief survey of pre-colonial palace organizations that performed police duties in the emirates of the 
North and the Yoruba kingdoms of the West is intended to show that there was a basis for the decision of the colonial 
administrators to allow the native authorities in those areas to own police forces. It needs to be emphasized that members 
of these pre-colonial palace organizations were more of personal servants of the chiefly authorities than agents of the 
community. They played a key role in enhancing and upholding the authorities of their employers. This image was 
perpetuated in the colonial and post-colonial periods. 
3.  INDIGENOUS POLICING AND THE EMERGENCE OF NAPFS IN 
NORTHERN NIGERIA 
With the advent of British rule in Northern Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard who was the head of the administration decided 
to adapt the political system that was in existence in the emirates to suit colonial exigencies. The Lugardian doctrine of 
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native administration was founded on the notion that there existed a strong, rather autocratic, Emir or chief whose 
authority the government could officially recognize and to whom it could delegate some responsibilities. In principle, the 
Emir would be subordinate to the British administrative officer but in appearance would be made to look like the actual 
ruler of his subjects.  
When Lugard left Nigeria in 1906 the mantle of leadership in Northern Nigeria fell on Percy Girouard. Under his 
administration there began a shift in emphasis from the administrative principle of „rule through native chiefs‟ to one of 
„rule through native chiefs on native lines‟ (White, 1981:33-38). The shift in administrative policy sought to create the 
Northern native administrations into near-autonomous entities. It is, therefore, within the foregoing political context that 
the formulation of a policing policy for the North should be appraised. After 1925, the measures taken resulted in the 
marginalization of the Government Police in the North.  
Tamuno (1970: 51-56) is of the view that the re-organization of the Government Police Force in Northern Nigeria 
between 1907 and 1913 under Governor Percy Girouard culminated in the recognition of the indigenous police 
organization in the emirates and that the dogarai eventually gained recognition as a unit of administration. Admittedly, 
the above position could also be buttressed by other factors that were instrumental to the emergence of the dogarai as a 
unit of native administration. For instance, at the point of British contact, the dogarai did not receive immediate official 
recognition as a unit of administration, though they were not prevented from performing their duties as earlier enumerated. 
They were simply not recognized probably because of the initial British attitude to the institution of slavery. Slave offices 
were among those the British had sworn not to recognize officially. Before a slave could be allowed to hold a public office 
he must first be emancipated (Lugard, 1970: iv).  
The dogarai eventually obtained recognition in 1907 through the spirited campaign mounted by administrative 
officers in the Kano Province with H.R. Palmer giving the most forceful voice. Palmer had joined the administrative 
service of Northern Nigeria in October 1904 and his first posting was to Katsina (then grouped within Kano Province) as 
an Assistant Resident. When a civil Government Police Force was raised for the North at the outset of colonial rule, it was 
observed that most of the members were not Hausa-Fulani. In fact, available statistics show that in 1908, the force was 
made up of 240 Hausa, 216 Yoruba, 102 Beriberi, 53 Fulani, 25 Nupe and 54 others whose ethnicity was unrecorded 
(Tamuno, 1970: 50). Thus, the force comprised 293 Hausa-Fulani against 397 members of other ethnic groups. It is not 
unlikely that most of the Hausa-Fulani elements were not deployed to serve in the emirates, a practice that was not 
incompatible with colonial policy at the time of „strangers policing strangers‟ (Killingray, 1986: 411-37). Understandably, 
this development is not surprising given the fact that colonial policing in Africa and even in colonial dependencies outside 
Africa such as Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, etc., was guided by the simple philosophy that the job of 
policing indigenous population would be more effective if the police force is alien (Hill, 1986:127; Kamira, 1999:3; 
Leighton, 1991: 485-488). 
Expectedly, the presence of this predominantly alien force in the emirates did not seem to have gone down well with 
the British administrators. In the annual report for 1907 on the province, the Resident Dr. F Cargill, reported on the 
conduct of the Government Police, by quoting approvingly from the comments of the Kano Divisional Resident, Major A. 
Festing and the Katsina Divisional Assistant Resident, H.R. Palmer. Palmer had complained that he was not comfortable 
with the use of these policemen for arrests. He contended that the sight of a man in uniform armed with a rifle caused „too 
much terror and alarm‟ for the citizens and that it is difficult for the people to distinguish between police and soldiers. He 
advocated the use of native police in native dress and called for the abolition of the Government Police Force.  
Incidentally, in 1907, Lugard‟s successor as Governor, Sir Percy Girouard, decided on a reorganization of the police 
system. There are three discernible reasons for the reorganization. One, it was intended to remove the predominantly alien 
Government Police from the emirates, especially those of the northerly provinces of Kano, Sokoto, Zaria and Borno. Two, 
it was intended to secure the loyalty of the Emirs by permitting them the use of their indigenous dogarai as police. This 
was very much in line with the administrative policy shift from „rule through native chiefs‟ to one of „rule through native 
chiefs on native lines‟ inaugurated by Girouard. Three, it could be cheaper to use the dogarai than the Government Police 
Force. In 1908, a wider implementation of the re-organization was effected (Tamuno, 1970: 54-55). 
Meanwhile, H.S. Goldsmith who was Lieutenant-Governor between 1917 and 1921 and Captain A.G. Uniacke, the 
Acting Inspector-General of the Government Police Force for the North engineered a new policy in 1919 that was aimed 
at subordinating the Government Police to these three people in sequence: the dogarai, the Government policeman‟s own 
superior officer and the District Officer whenever the issue was of a local interest (Rotimi, 2001: 18).  
Moreover, as soon as H.R. Palmer assumed office as substantive Lieutenant- Governor of Northern Nigeria in 1925, 
he and his subordinates decided not only to build up the NA police in the emirates but also to extend its network in the 
southerly provinces. Obviously, their preference was for policing the territory more with NA police than with the 
Government Police. Towards this end, the pre-colonial dogarai police institution was adapted for use in the emirates. 
Having convinced themselves of the soundness of their policing policy for the emirates, the administrative officers tried to 
extend it to cover the rest of the protectorate where it had not been known before (Rotimi, 2001: 19-20).  
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4.  THE NATIVE ADMINISTRATION POLICE FORCES AND THE  
RIOTS 
The first colonial chiefs in Tivland were not provided with policemen. The chiefs themselves appointed able-bodied 
young men to serve as policemen. When later, the colonial administrators saw the need to assign policemen to the chiefs, 
the chiefs were asked to look for men of their choice and bring them for appointment. In some cases, the chiefs were given 
police uniforms and asked to appoint whoever they wanted. Since the policemen were seen as symbols of authority in the 
North it soon became a coveted job, and their appointments were marked with corrupt practices. Policemen in Tivland 
were dreaded and feared. They arrested people arbitrarily without giving them reasons for their arrests or the offence they 
committed(Anum,2008:). They mistreated people at the slightest provocation, especially tax evaders. A policeman could 
scatter a whole market on a market day. He could also take by force, a person‟s property without any challenge. In Akigas 
words: 
on his return to the village, things began to happen. He laid hands on peoples property, saying you can‟t play 
the fool with me. I was not made policeman for nothing. It cost me a cow (Rotimi,2001:146).  
The role of the  Native Administrative Police Forces in Tivland in the turbulent political period proceeding Nigeria‟s 
independence  in different parts of the country especially Tivland has been very controversial. The police being a 
necessary body in any civil society are charged with the traditional duty of preventing crime. These roles, however, can be 
usurped by the government in power. In these cases, policemen see themselves as loyal servants of the ruling elites and 
not for the well being of the general public.  The Tiv Native Administrative  police found itself walking a tight rope being 
accused variously by agents of the Northern People‟s Congress(NPC), controlled government on one hand and the United 
Middle Belt Congress(UMBC), the Tiv party and its  Action Group(AG), ally forming the  opposition on the other.  
The perception of the police force in Tivland was that it was a Hausa/Fulani force of occupation designed to extend 
Hausa/Fulani hegemony. Even the name that a policeman was called was foreign and hated. The  „dogari’ or „yandoka,‟ 
commonly used in Tivland  were not Tiv names but  rather Hausa names. The police in the early years of party politics 
were encouraged with other N.A employees to have a stake in the survival of the system by combining their NA job with 
membership of the government approved political party the NPC(Rotimi,2001:146). The police under the control of the 
District heads and the NA officials in Tivland molested the Tiv people who were opposed to the NPC. The police 
protected NPC members at their rallies from UMC attacks. In a letter from J.E.Egbe (ASP) and Adviser Benue NA Police 
Forces to the Police Chief Benue Province on UMBC hooliganism, J.E.Egbe stated: 
on the 2nd November 1958 members of the NPC Gboko branch held a public meeting/lecture in Gboko. At 
the end of the lecture one man among other questioners put up his hand to ask a question. He was granted leave 
to do so. Then he said “you told us not to follow the Yoruba, why then should we follow the Hausas who call us 
Arna”? Many people clapped as they heard the question. At this juncture Danlahadi, the Divisional Secretary of 
NPC got up and ordered the constable on duty to arrest this man for disturbing at their NPC lecture when he is 
an UMBC(NAK/MAKPROF/APL/34,F9/61). 
We can see that the Tiv N.A police, instead of maintaining law and order, were used as an instrument of repression for 
the harassment of political opponents especially the UMBC – AG Alliance. This situation led the Tiv to turn against 
members of the NA police during the revolts of 1960 and 1964. The Tiv took advantage of disturbance to let vengeance on 
the police. In the numerous Tiv/police encounters the police were humiliated. 
It is worthy to note that NPC supporters equally complained of police harassment. In some cases they maintained that 
the police sided with the UMBC against NPC members. In a petition written to the Minister of Internal Affairs by H.O. 
Abaagu, NPC member in the Federal House of Representatives, he accused the Tiv NA of taking sides with the UMBC 
and the police of harassing the NPC. He speaks of an instance: 
At Ihugh in Jechira Intermediate Area, Tiv Division, an NPC who was addressing a mass meeting was 
pushed down while a UMBC-AG man jumped on the table and started to preach UMBC-AG despite he had no 
permit, yet the police took no action AK/MAKPROF/APL/34,F9/61).  
The Minister reacted swiftly to Abaagu‟s petition, by asking the Resident to furnish his office with information 
regarding police participation in politics(NAK/MAKPROF/MIA711S.1,2/4/1959).This showed how serious the 
government took issues when the interest of the NPC was involved. The D.O. Tiv Division who reacted to the query 
absolved the NA police of complicity in the harassment of NPC supporters by UMBC supporters. 
From the foregoing we can safely conclude that the police were serving the interests of the NPC controlled 
government that gave them nourishment. That explains why the riots of 1960 and 1964 were directed against the NPC 
controlled native administration and the NA police forces led by the Tor Tiv Gondo Aluor. This situation notes that the 
NA police in Tiv division had been walking a tight rope since the advent of party politics. While they could not effectively 
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check UMBC fanatics, from disrupting NPC rallies, they also did not accede to NPC requests to molest UMBC supporters. 
The Tiv riots that broke out, capitalized on these existing divisions. The clashes started mainly between the supporters of 
the NPC and UMBC. These riots were motivated by the perceived marginalization and insecurity on the part of the Tiv 
and their feeling that the members of the NPC were responsible for their condition. The Tiv were suspicious of the 
authoritarian native administration system and its attempt to forcefully penetrate  Tivland. They saw the native authorities 
as an embodiment of the NPC. The first riots were carried out in 1960 and tagged nande-ior, nande meaning „arson or 
burning‟ down houses, while the second riots were those of 1964 and called atemityough meant „headbreaking‟ 
(Ihila,2008). 
 
5.  THE RIOTS OF 1960-NANDE NANDE (BURNING)  
The start of the crisis was when the elected Tiv NA council with a majority of UMBC members was dissolved in 
November 1959, and a new one reconstituted which was totally pro-NPC. The Tor Tiv, who was the head of the new NA 
council, was coerced into supporting the NPC. 
Before independence on October 1, 1960 there were elections held in 1959 to elect members of the House of 
Representatives from which a government would be chosen to lead Nigeria to independence. Incidentally, all of the seven 
seats in Tiv Division went to the UMBC/AG alliance. The NA officials and Chiefs did not like this development. They 
believe that if something was not done fast, the UMBC/AG alliance would also win the seats in the Northern House of 
Assembly. Consequently, intimidation of UMBC/AG members by the NA controlled NPC became so common and they 
believed would soon blow into full scale violence. This situation led to an increasing open defiance and resistance to the 
lawful authorities in Tivland led by the Tor Tiv. The Tor Tiv was accused of using his powers wrongly and attempt made 
to curtail this. In a petition from M.A. Gundu to the Resident Benue Province, the Tor Tiv was accused of usurping the 
post of Tiv Native Authority Administrative Secretary from one Iyorliam Ikuan and giving it to one George Atim Atedze: 
As it has ever been the desire of the Tor Tiv to usurp the post at all costs for his kinsman, George Atim 
Atedze, on the 28th January, he autocratically revoked the decision of the Council imposing on it George Atim 
Atedze‟s appointment in preference over Iyorliam Ikuan who has been holding the post efficiently for over two 
years without blemish. The Tor Tiv in his exalted position as the head of the Tiv Native Authority is 
encouraging clannishness – Ichongo versus Ipusu and there is a danger of plunging the Division into a state of 
disturbance (NAK/MAKPROF/APC/34 Vol IV. Ref.TPU/2B/221)  
In addition, the Tor-Tiv Tiv‟s imposition of unpopular kindred heads on the local inhabitants in August 1960 were 
resisted. A similar resistance took place in Mbatie clan. There was soon a breakdown of law and order. 
 A major incident that signaled the start of the riots was in August 1960, when the clan head of Yandev, a supporter of 
the NPC, was assaulted with two of his policemen and other tax collectors while trying to collect tax. This was followed 
by further attacks on policemen who tried to arrest these tax evaders. In the eyes of the people all chiefs, clan heads, NA 
police and tax collectors were pro-NPC and so enemies to the people. The riot proper was triggered by an attempt by the 
clan head of Yandev to close a market owned by one Kumbul Akpai, a UMBC supporter. The clan head of Yandev Ol 
Ako and some strong NPC supporters had gone to close the market with a detachment of the NA police but was repelled 
by the people. The intervention of the Tor-Tiv did not help matters. It was maintained that the Tor-Tiv did not come to 
make peace but he came with more NA policemen to enforce the order. They demanded for the return of their clan head, 
Ol Ako, who had fled to Gboko. The Tor Tiv, who feared for Ako‟s life, refused to grant their request and withdrew. On 
the 25th August, a riot squad of the NA police armed with batons and shield was drafted to the market to enforce the 
closure order. The clash that followed between the police and the people who were armed with dangerous bows, arrows 
and cutlasses led to injury of three policemen and their consequent withdrawal. 
It was against this background of the Yandev incident that the burning and looting soon spread to other parts of 
Tivland in December 1960. The riots led to attacks of known NPC members in Tivland and  their properties were looted 
and destroyed. Apart from an incident in Wukari, all the acts of arson and destruction were confined to Tivland. The 
Wukari incident was an attack on NPC members who were passing through Tiv territory to attend an NPC convention at 
Wukari. This incident, however, did not lead to the escalation of violence as the Jukun refused to react (Makar, 
1994:227).The police could not contain the rioting as law and order broke down. This led to young men to form 
themselves into militia groups, causing destruction and taking over the functions of traditional rulers. The majority of 
important NPC members and traditional rulers fled to Gboko during the riots. 
The 1960 riots had serious repercussions on the history of Tivland. Apart from the damage done to property, the 1960 
riots did not involve large-scale killings like those of 1964(Daily Times, Oct.20, 1960). Some of the people died as a result 
of police shorting, while others died being killed by militia groups or those defending their property. Over 50,000 people 
were involved. The Nigeria police force maintained that during the disturbances it arrested over 5,000 Tiv people for such 
offences as murder, arson, rioting, and damage to property and injury to persons. Out of these 3,882 were convicted (Daily 
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Times, June 30,1960).Despite the riots, politicians on the side of the NPC and the UMBC tried to restrain their supporters 
from violence. The fact that 50,000 were involved in these riots was a clear indication that the situation could not be 
controlled by the police. An appeal was made to Anja, the Divisional President of the NPC, and to J.S. Tara, the UMBC 
President General, to assist in restoring peace. The positive response of leaders of the warring factions contributed much 
to the return of peace, even though fragile in Tivland. 
 
6.  THE RIOTS OF 1964 –ATEMITYOUGH (HEADBREAKING)  
The year 1960 that the first Tiv riots took place was the year independence was granted to Nigeria by Britain. One might 
expect that the series of reconciliatory moves that took place could end the political upheavals in Tivland but the reverse 
was the case. Events that followed the departure of the colonial authorities led to worsening relations between the 
belligerents and hence the second Tiv riots of February and March 1964. This riot was characterized by the burning and 
looting of property, as well as the maiming and breaking of peoples‟ heads (known as the atemityough). 
It is to be noted that after the end of the first riot, a Sole Administrator was appointed to run the affairs of the Tiv NA. 
His duties included the restoration of law and order, the reconciliation of the various political factions in Tivland, and 
assisting the office of the Tor Tiv to regain his authority and personality that had been greatly eroded during the riots. The 
sole administrator, Mr. M.J. Dent, on assumption of office began to usurp the functions of the elders and chiefs at the same 
time showing sympathy with the NPC. The Administrator in his efforts to reconcile the warring factions looked into the 
complaints brought against some of the District heads, suspending some and retaining others. The NPC were unimpressed 
with his actions which they described as pro-UMBC, and reported him to the Northern Regional Government. Mr. Dent‟s 
attempts to organize peace and reconciliatory meetings between the two sides were met with resistance, a non-cooperative 
attitude from both sides. Mr. Dent was accused by NPC firstly of refusing to grant a permit for them to hold a rally but 
granting one to the UMBC to hold a rally at Agwabi, 23 miles on Gboko-Wukari road (NAK/MAKPROF/APC/34/F9/61). 
He was also accused of non-cooperation and taking unilateral actions.  
Generally, the Tiv were dissatisfied after the riot because they were made to pay extra taxes for damages caused by the 
riots. More than 50,000 taxpayers were made in addition extra N5.10 per head in addition to the general annual tax of 
N4.50(Anifowose,1979:128). A taxpayer who defaulted was imprisoned for six months. This excessive taxation was 
generally paid including those areas which did not take part in the riot. At the same time, some areas known to have 
sympathy for the NPC were excluded. This decision which was taken by the NPC regional government against the Tiv 
was on the advice of a few NPC elders in Tivland. It was seen as further evidence of political oppression and on indirect 
way to punish UMBC/AG supporters for rioting and damaging the property belonging to NPC supporters. 
Following the success of the UMBC in the 1960 riots, the popularity of the party increased their victory in the North 
Regional Election of 1961. This victory coincided with the arrest of Tarka and a fresh determination by the UMBC to 
unite and resist the foreign dominated NPC, though the UMBC/AG alliance broke off in 1962 following the AG crisis in 
the West, the UMBC continued to wax stronger in Tivland. In November 1963, there was the composition of the Tiv 
Advisory Council, which the Tiv complained that though they were the majority party they had only been given minority 
seats. The UMBC annual conference held at Agasha between 4th and 6th February 1964 exploited the existing tension and 
condemned the excessive taxation and its method of collection. As tax collectors were possible NPC supporters, the 
UMBC members frowned at their modus operandi; hence, they were the first targets of attack. 
The first major disturbances began in Tombo Mbalagh where the clan head Gbagbar Apinega a pro-NPC on the 12th 
February was seized by rioters and killed along with three others. The hands of Gbagbar‟s scribe were cut off by the 
rioters. A team of N.A police which had been sent to the area to restore peace had to return to Gboko when they found a 
large crowd. Though a few arrests were made, the killing of Gbagbar led to a free for all fight between supporters of the 
NPC and supporters of the UMBC. This disorder led to an ambush of eight policemen who were latter slain and their guns 
seized by the riotersAbeghe, 2005:104). The murder of Gbagbar marked effectively the start of atemityough. As in the 
previous riot, the violence spread to some other parts of Tivland. Unlike the first riot, the new wave of violence 
concentrated on personal violence rather than violence on property.  
The later stages of the riots were to manifest themselves in clashes involving the Ichongo and Ipusu segments of Tiv 
society. The revolts were almost converted into an Ipusu/Ichongo confrontation with the Ipusu (UMBC), led by Tondo 
Agede fighting against the Ichongo (NPC) led by Aernyi Kangur(Hembe,2003:225). Most of the fighting during the riots 
took place at night. The UMBC members symbolized their confrontation with the broom (chanca) to sweep out Baja or 
Shoja petali (NPC). At Mbaiase in Masev, the people there were predominantly NPC but they were always attacked by the 
few UMBC members in the area who were supported by neighboring Ipusu areas. This led to serious fighting between the 
NPC and the UMBC with each side receiving reinforcements. Other serious battles were fought in Mbachin, Aliade and 
Mbayion. 
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7.  THE USE OF MILITANT GROUPS 
Militant groups were widely believed to be used by the various political parties during the political disturbances in 
Tivland. The NPC had the Sardauna Brigade as its militant wing, the Okpara Youth Brigade and Zikist were militant 
wings of the NCNC, Awolowo Youth Pioneers was the militant wing of the AG, Akintola Young Pioneers for the NNDP 
and Tarka Young Pioneers for the UMBC(Abeghe,2005:104). The political violence in Tivland was between the 
Sardauna Brigade of the NPC and Tarka Young Pioneers. The Sardauna Brigade that had existed for sometime in the 
North did not surface early in Tivland, and even when it did, it was not very popular in the beginning. It was when the 
sizable population of Tiv people began to join the NPC because of coercion or the purported benefits that membership of 
the Brigade began to grow. The Sardauna Brigade engaged the Tarka Young Pioneers in bloody conflicts. The Brigades 
operated with confidence in Tivland knowing that it was operating under the cover of the ruling political party, so they 
unleashed terror against their opponents.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has analyzed the political developments linking  the misuse of Native Administrative Police Forces in  Tivland, 
Central Nigeria to the post-independence  political upheavals. At independence, Tivland was polarized with the existing 
traditional institutions and the Native Administrative Police Forces supporting the government of the day, the NPC, 
against the UMBC, a predominantly  minority Tiv party. In order to exert a firm control over Tivland, the government 
resorted to  the use of the  Native Administrative Police Forces, a situation the Tiv  rejected  and  decided to rally round 
their leader J.S.Tarka, and their party, the UMBC. Their rejection of the NPC controlled government and its means of 
coercion was symbolic, as the acceptance would mean accepting Hausa /Fulani domination. The rejection of the NPC , 
and all that was associated with it was to lead to the bitter and violent political upheavals in Tivland during the First 
Republic. The paper has however shown the dangers inherent in ethnic politics.  
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